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[Quesnay's] emphasis on a circular-flow model can be traced to Thomas 
Hobbes's use of William Harvey's model of the circulation of "nutrients" in the 
blood as a physiological analogy for the material foundation of the 
commonwealth." 
          Kenneth Stokes (1994, p.27) 
 
 
Introduction1 
In the 1750s Dr Francois Quesnay founded what many regard as the first true school of economics, 
known in English as the Physiocrats. Quesnay's basic model (1758) is believed to have been 
inspired, given his medical knowledge, from William Harvey's conclusions relating to the circular 
flow of blood through the body.2 
 
In the wake of Keynes' General Theory (1936), representations of a circular flow of payments 
appear in most first year textbooks of macroeconomics and economic principles (Samuelson 2001, 
pp.29,288), enabling students to appreciate the need for balance in a closed economy while 
allowing for net exports as a balancing item for an open national economy. Such circular flow 
models are able to convey to students of economics the sense of macroeconomic equilibrium in a 
way that the aggregate demand - aggregate supply models of comparative statics cannot.3 
 
The development of circular flow modelling reached its educational apex in the Keynesian era of 
the 1950s and 1960s, reflected in the hydraulic modelling process most famously attributed to Bill 
Phillips, the creator of Moniac.4 Indeed that gave rise to the phrase "hydraulic Keynesianism" 
                                                 
1 I would like to acknowledge Chris Carson for his supply of interesting source material, and Stuart Birks for his 
comments. 
2 While Schumpeter (1954, p.240 n9) traces circular flow analysis to Richard Cantillon (d. 1734), and believes that 
Quesnay's later writing was independently inspired by the discovery of the circulation of the blood by William Harvey 
(1628) and others in the seventeenth century. Cantillon's seminal work, though well circulated, was not published until 
1755 (Hébert in Cantillon (2010), p.6). Hébert (p.5) traces Cantillon to Hobbes. 
3 Schumpeter (p.242) describes "the Cantillon-Quesnay tableau" as "the first method ever devised in order to convey an 
explicit conception of the nature of economic equilibrium". 
4 In effect, an analogue computer, that owed much to Phillips' engineering skills in the early development of 
hydroelectricity in  New Zealand. 
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(Laidler 2001, p.4), coined by Coddington in 1976.5 Laidler (p.12) noted that this phrase had gained 
"a distinctly perjorative [sic] overtone", linking that to "the extent to which New-classical ideas 
have changed the way all of us think about how macroeconomic theory should be done". 
 
I have argued that circular flow approaches have been under-developed in economics' education 
(Rankin 2010a, 2010b), and that the resulting gap in our thinking has made it difficult for 
economics to adequately incorporate unbalanced financial phenomena into its models. While we get 
financial economics as a sub-discipline in which financial assets (claims) are treated as analogues of 
the goods and services of 'real' economics, we fail to explore some other quite important 
relationships between financial behaviour and real economic phenomena. 
 
The simple flow model presented here differs markedly from the standard presentation, and draws 
its inspiration directly from the human body (or at least its upper half) in the spirit of Quesnay and 
Phillips.6 It its core form, this is a closed economy model, analogous to the global economic and 
financial system.7 And, in the spirit of classical economics, it posits classes of households. These 
two classes are the 'saving class' (S) – a modern conflation of the classical capitalist and landlord 
classes – and the 'subsistence class', although for the latter I prefer the prosaic 'lower income class' 
(L) who essentially spend their income as they earn it. The L-class can be thought of as the 
labouring or working class, albeit in a modern welfare-state context. 
 
While the expression "savings class" is not commonly used today, it was widely used from 1927 to 
1942 (Google), the period of the Great Depression, as shown in Figure 1. Given that, as shown in 
Figure 2, net realised8 private surpluses represented 8% of world GDP in 2009 (Rankin 2011e), up 
from less than 1% two years earlier, it would seem an apposite time for this label to once again 
return to the lexicon of political economy. 
 
                                                 
5 In Coddington's words (p.1264) "The theoretical content of the body of ideas that has been propagated through the 
educational system in the West since World War II as 'Keynesian Economics' (by, for example, Paul Samuelson's 
pedagogically authoritative textbook) I shall proceed to refer to as 'hydraulic Keynesianism'." Coddington, looking for 
micro-foundations, was concerned that the only decision-making agent in these circular flow models was "the 
Government" (p.1265). 
6 An analogy with a child's body would enable us to better envisage the concept of growth. However, as the analogy is 
developed, the capitalist head of the model makes decisions more with the caution of the adult mind. 
7 Strictly, a closed system would be a perpetual motion system. Thus the global economic system requires energy from 
outside; namely from the sun. In classical 3-factor models, this energy requirement is absorbed into the factor "land", 
and is treated as a free input. 
8 Almost certainly desired private surpluses were much higher. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of use of the terms 'Saving Class' and 'Saving Classes' 
 
source: Google Ngram Viewer 
 
Figure 2:  
 
 
In the spirit of contemporary circular flow representations, these classes can best be thought of as 
sectors. Thus we have an S-sector and an L-sector as nodes of a circular flow model, with S being 
analogous to the human head, and L an analogue for the left-hand. Appropriately, the word 
'capitalism' derives from the Latin word for 'head'. 
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A third node, or sector, of this flow representation is governments (G), noting that in a global 
context, governments are much like large households. Our G-sector is represented as analogous to 
the human right-hand, leaving us with a flow model with three income-expenditure nodes and a 
production centre (P), shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Normal 'Arterial' and 'Venal' Flows between Sectors 
 
 
We note that, here, there is no such thing as Coddington's "the Government" (1976 p.1265) ruling 
over the global economy. Rather, the key decision-making node is S, the saving class, through the 
extent to which it saves, borrows, purchases investment goods, and concentrates income. This 
S-sector includes the financial system and all of the spending decisions channelled within it. 
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The Biological Analogy 
The flow model has three nodes (or sectors), plus a production centre. The nodes are the head 
(analogous to the saving class), the left hand (analogous to the low-income class), and the 
right-hand (analogous to governments). 
 
The production centre is analogous to the heart, stomach and lungs. Resources coming into the body 
(oxygen, food, water) combine in the production centre to create goods and services (nutrients) 
which are transported through the arterial blood to the three sectors. 
 
The nutrients represent real GDP (the 'economic cake'), both aggregate output and the 
commensurate claims – rights to goods and services – that we call income. Thus the nutrients are 
distributed through the arterial system to each of the three sectors (S, L, G), in accordance with a set 
of distributional rules determined principally by the market price system. We note that market 
prices such as wages are influenced by the relative market power of the S-class.9 We also note that 
these rules of income distribution are influenced by governments' rights of taxation, and 
governments' judicial roles in determining and enforcing property rights. 
 
The blood plasma essentially represents the monetary medium, which does its work by circulating. 
In this flow model, money flows (like a conveyor belt) with income, rather than against the 
expenditure flow as is represented in contemporary textbook circular flow models. 
 
Inflation can be said to have existed when the arterial blood has become more dilute than usual, 
with deflation being represented by blood having become increasingly concentrated. Here, however, 
my story is about unemployment, the actual consequence of saved income neither allocated to 
others' consumption nor to investment spending. Under many situations, possibly most situations, 
the saving class will save (or repay debt) however seductive a deflationary environment might be in 
persuading them to do otherwise. The compulsion to save in the face of an uncertain future, appears 
to be hard-wired (Rankin 2010a, p.96) into the behaviour of most (but not all) humans, once 
physiological needs are met. 
 
The return (venal) flow represents spending. The money travelling from the sectors to the centre 
carries information (analogous to hormones), and determines both what and how much the 
production centre should produce. 
                                                 
9 This power presumably arises from the marginal utility of S-class members able to be more concerned about future 
security needs vis-à-vis present needs, for example as expressed in Maslow's (1954) 'hierarchy of needs'. 
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Figure 3 represents an abstract 'normal' multi-sector global economy, and helps us to see how real 
world flows differ from normal flows, much as we accept that real world competition is imperfect, 
rather than the realisation of the 'perfect' norm. 
 
Under these postulated normal conditions, traditional injections and withdrawals disappear. There is 
no foreign sector, by definition, and the G and L sectors run balanced budgets, by assumption. 
Saving and private investment is endogenous to the S sector. 
 
The low income (L) sector is made up of households who spend their entire incomes, essentially on 
consumer goods known as "wage goods" (Keynes 1936, p.7), which are consumed directly. While 
some L-class households are self-employed – petty capitalists – the sector gains its right to its share 
of real GDP through its supply of labour (including self-employed labour) to the production centre. 
 
Incomes achieved in the L-sector can be understood as central to the assessment of material living 
standards in the economic system as a whole, given that incomes are higher in the S-sector. Thus, as 
a performance measure of rising living standards, L-class per capita incomes must increase. 
 
The government (G) sector is made up of organisations which purchase collective goods and, 
through their sovereign or municipal rights, have the ability to influence the rules of distribution. 
Governments have the ability to claim a share of real GDP by levying taxes. While collective goods 
are generally of an investment nature, some, such as city parks, contain direct consumption benefits 
to households. Thus living standards are functionally related to the expenditure of governments. 
Access to collective goods clearly represents an aspect of the well-being of the L-sector.   
 
In the system's abstract normal state of balance, governments spend only their income, and all of 
their income. Like the L-sector, the G-sector runs a balanced sectoral balance sheet. The flow of 
arterial blood to each hand is unimpeded in its return, as venal blood, to the centre. 
 
The Saving Class 
This group, which represents the decision-making head of the economic system, could be known as 
the 'saving and borrowing' sector. The saving class purchase a combination of wage goods, 
non-wage consumer goods10, and, through their companies11, investment goods12. They also expend 
                                                 
10 Sometimes called "profit goods" by socialist writers (Carruthers 1883, Fairman 1888). For these writers, profit goods 
are pure luxury goods. Keynes (1936) uses Pigou's term "non-wage-goods" alongside "wage-goods". 
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much effort on the acquisition of financial assets on secondary markets, exchanging one kind of 
claim on future nutrients for another. Thus, financial services represent a substantial example of a 
non-wage-good. Further, inflated values of financial assets periodically lead many S-class 
households to abandon their usual caution, incurring debts for consumption spending that they 
normally would not have done. 
 
The financial system resides within this S-sector. It is the system through which balance must take 
place in the context that saving, an inherently unbalancing activity that must be matched by 
investment spending, represents the raison d'être of this class. 
 
The saving of the saving classes represents the capital of the global system; the nutrients passing to 
the saving class but not required by them for consumption purposes.13 The most direct way for the 
saving class to allocate this capital is via their companies as equity capital, through purchases of 
investment goods. The system balances if the remainder of the capital is allocated within the sector 
to companies via financial intermediaries, also for the purchase of investment goods. 
 
Figure 4 shows the circular flow within the S-sector. When the sector is in equilibrium, all saved 
nutrients are allocated as investment goods. All nutrients are utilised by S-class households and 
their companies (red arterial income flows), albeit with the help of financial intermediaries (banks). 
The sector as a whole is in balance, neither in credit nor in debt, with new expenditure flows shown 
in violet. And when the S-sector is in balance, then the whole inter-sectoral system is in balance, 
given a definition of normality that assumes such balance within the L and G sectors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11 I choose to use the word "companies" rather than 'businesses' or 'firms', because of its clear connotation of businesses 
as collectives of S-class households. 
12 Almost everyone except some economists regard 'investment' more as a synonym than as a complement of 'saving'. 
Here, I try to use words like 'spending', 'purchases' and 'goods' in conjunction with the word 'investment', to make my 
use of this word clear. 
13 We bear in mind that the principal purpose of saving for individuals is to manage their nutrient intake over their 
life-cycle. Most nutrients unrequired by middle-aged S-class households will be claimed for consumption purposes by 
younger older S-class households. Capital is net of such consumption. Diamond and Saez (2011) explore the life-cycle 
hypothesis, that assumes all individuals intend to optimise their life-time consumption, and note the presence of biases 
that lead to net saving in practice. They also note that versions of the life-cycle hypothesis are dynastic, enabling 
individuals therefore to plan for infinite life expectancies. 
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Figure 4: Head (Income, Consumption, Savings and Investment) 
 
 
The financial system requires an activist arm, to offset monetary hoarding (which impedes the 
return flow) and to finance growth. The allocation of capital to new investment goods implies future 
nutrient growth. Thus, unlike nutrients, modern money – which is more concept than commodity – 
is able to be created within the financial system.14 The amount of venal money flowing from the 
head to the heart may be more, or less, than the amount flowing in. It can be regarded as an 
equilibrium condition, however, for the amount of venal money to equal the amount of arterial 
money, subject to a growth requirement. 
 
                                                 
14 In the days of commodity money before modern banking, we could think of money being created in the centre, with 
specie being minted for governments. Thus modern money represents a departure from the blood analogy 
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The head becomes the seat of possible imbalance, in particular when the unallocated nutrients we 
call capital are not fully allocated as investment goods. While crises are endogenous to the saving 
class, if the distributional rules of the system as a whole have an increasing bias in favour of the 
S-class, then such crises themselves become more probable. 
 
The saving class grows under a number of conditions. The first condition is simply the presence of 
proportionate economic growth.15 Another is net migration from the low-income class to the saving 
class. A third is increasing inequality that may arise from the relative market power of the saving 
class. A fourth is a relative reduction of the governments' share of output; a situation that may have 
been orchestrated by political pressure arising from within the saving class. A fifth is that increased 
labour productivity tends to increase the quantum of nutrients that pass to S more so than to L; in 
Marxian terms, an increase in surplus value. 
 
In each of these cases, there is more capital (nutrients flowing to S unallocated to consumption) to 
allocate, and increased risk of not being able to fully allocate that capital as investment purchases. 
Industrial capitalism works by allocating capital to the purchase of investment goods that in turn 
facilitate the production of mass-produced wage goods. If the ability of the L-class to acquire wage 
goods is being eroded – eg through reduced income shares – then the likelihood that capital cannot 
be allocated becomes even larger.16 
 
Crisis of Imbalance 
Nutrients not allocated within the S-sector for consumption or investment purposes translate, 
through reduced venal monetary flows, into unemployment in the production centre. This in turn 
reduces the output of nutrients, disproportionately to the low-income class and to the government 
sector, given the market-based rules that determine these flows. Systemic imbalances are 
aggravated by their effects. 
 
To avert such a crisis of unallocated capital, the financial intermediaries, representing their saving 
principals, will seek to lend17 the unallocated slice of GDP to either L or G, rather than allow it to 
wither as unemployment. Thus we need to construct arteries that connect the head with the hands. 
The human analogue becomes more abstract. Figure 5 shows these additional inter-nodal arterial 
                                                 
15 Whereas growth may arise from investment spending in S, government spending in G, or increased labour supply, it 
may also result purely from productivity gains, unrelated to any measurable input arising from either sector. 
16 Ponzi schemes represent opportunists within the S-sector acquiring unallocated nutrients in the form of luxury goods. 
These schemes should be understood as a symptom of the sector's frequent inability to allocate capital. 
17 An alternative dynamic is for the S-class to gift its surplus nutrients to the L-class; charity. 
 10
flows as dashed curves. Arterial flows from S to L or G reverse over time, given that lending and 
borrowing can be characterised as intertemporal exchange. 
 
Because this allocation will usually take the form of loans, the S-class become a creditor sector, and 
thereby L and/or G become debtor sectors. We may note that intersectoral loans which are written 
off become gifts (intersectoral transfers), ex post; so, to an extent, do loans struck at negative 
ex post real interest rates. Hence inflation has the potential to behave very much like charity (or 
philanthropy), given that S is now operating as a creditor sector and L as a debtor sector. 
 
Initially the S-sector is likely to look to the L-sector (rather than to G) to receive S's unallocated 
nutrients, as borrowed wage goods. This helps to resolve the problem of weak demand for wage 
goods creating an insufficient demand for investment goods. 
 
So, essentially, the S sector seeks to participate in intertemporal exchange with the L sector.18 In 
this case, S delivers nutrients to L in the present, in return for a greater flow in the future (the 
"return journey"; Corden 2011) from L to S. 
 
When this exchange takes place, S becomes a creditor sector and L becomes a debtor sector, 
meaning that the private sector as a whole appears to be in balance. (See Figure 2, for years 2006 
and 2007.) Just as it is appears to be a goal for households within S to accumulate credit balances in 
intertemporal exchange, it may also be taken as an objective for the sector as a whole.19 Certainly 
our common observation is that S-class individuals choose to die with large credit balances, in 
contradiction to the premise of the life-cycle hypothesis. 
 
The problem of unallocated capital is not commonly seen as a problem by those who choose not to 
consume or invest the nutrients that their income of nutrients entitles them to. While individuals 
may succeed in running surpluses, indeed over long periods, a closed system cannot.20 Surpluses 
cannot be achieved unless accommodated by deficits. S-households tend to assume – without much 
thought – that there are always sufficient numbers of willing and creditworthy borrowers who will 
                                                 
18 I use the term intertemporal exchange rather than intertemporal trade because of the widespread connotation that 
trade involves exchanges across international borders. Many of the issues addressed here are discussed in Corden 
(2011), albeit in an international trade context. 
19 This is equivalent to mercantilism (Rankin 2011b), the pursuit of financial surpluses – indefinite surpluses – of a 
country or sector. Krugman (2012, p.28) and Eichengreen (2011, p.62) allude to Germany's historical mercantilism. 
This might also be called one-way intertemporal exchange where the creditor party, while always concerned about the 
capacity of the debtor party to supply goods and services as contracted, has no actual interest in receiving these. 
20 Koo (2011, p.37) refers to this as the fallacy of composition. 
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acquire their capital in the forms of investment goods, and reward them with compound interest 
(inflated claims that for the most part will never be realised). 
 
Figure 5: Credit and Transfer Flows between Sector Nodes 
 
 
The reality is that it is not easy to persuade other sectors to incur chronic deficits so that the S-sector 
can run ongoing surpluses. Further, by the very nature of the L-class these loans will be for wage 
goods, which may include commodity housing. Hard-sell marketing of both goods and loans 
enables the financial intermediaries to allocate the S-class's surpluses. The crisis of unallocated 
capital is thus postponed, indeed giving the appearance that all is well, with financial assets offering 
near-permanent capital-gains that seduce some S-class households into conspicuous consumption. 
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This solution can work for a while, and was clearly a dominant (if not the dominant) financial 
dynamic of the 2000s' decade. However, three problems emerged: the capacity of L to sustain the 
return flow of interest and repayments, the incapacity of S to spend the interest and repayments 
from L, and the decreased willingness to continue to allocate capital into investment goods that 
produce wage goods. 
 
The unsustainability of this increased indebtedness of L (and speculative indebtedness within many 
S companies and households) generated a global "balance sheet recession" (Koo 2011) in 2008. The 
highly leveraged 'assets' unravelled as households and companies collectively sought to repay 
debt.21 Nutrients flowing into the S-sector had nowhere to go, except that is, to governments. 
 
So, when the lend-to-L strategy failed, S, having reverted to a strategy of low consumption and not 
able to allocate to itself all the GDP-nutrients its income entitled it to, turned to a lend-to-G 
strategy. Nutrients unallocated by S flowed as loans to G, with the expectation that G in future 
would be able to raise sufficient taxes to fund a larger future reverse flow. Only faith in this 
revenue-raising ability of G was required, because so long as S is never actually able to consume or 
invest its normal income, then the additional nutrients that represent the debt-service "return 
journey" (Corden 2011) need never make that journey. Increasing public debt may continue to 
represent the increasing financial wealth22 (credit) of the S-class; decreasing public debt would 
equally represent the decreasing financial wealth of the S-class, with individual S-households 
finding it ever more difficult to achieve their objectives of financial surpluses. 
 
Not surprisingly, this strategy, which worked very well in 2010 and 2011, also proves to be 
unsustainable, largely (but not only) because what is in reality a crisis of accumulating private 
sector surpluses (meaning unallocated goods and services, and, increasingly, the additional goods 
and services that would have been produced by unemployed resources had they been employed) 
tends to be interpreted as a public debt crisis. 
 
At least within the L-class, there are sound bankruptcy mechanisms whereby many small L-class 
obligations to S-class creditors are quietly written off. No such mechanisms exist, between G 
debtors and S creditors, whereby ex ante loans become ex post gifts. Nutrients not required by S can 
always find a worthwhile use in G. With higher taxes on S incomes, those nutrients could have 
                                                 
21 One important weakness of the textbook circular flow models is their inability to satisfactorily represent the debt 
repayments of companies. 
22 While the government expenditure made possible by this debt would represent real contributions to living standards. 
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made a more direct transit to G. Government expenditure would not appear unaffordable if 
members of the S-class facilitated the required increases in taxation, and minimised their 
tax-avoidance practices. 
 
Much of the impetus for S companies and households to run surpluses arises from the need to repay 
debt. In such cases – balance sheet recessions – governments must accommodate private surpluses. 
Debt repayment is not mercantilist hoarding. In large parts of the world economy in 2012, both S 
and L (together, the private sector) are trying to pay down debt. They can only succeed if 
governments will agree to use the actual and potential nutrients that S and L are unable to use. It 
was the willingness of government in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s to accommodate the 
private-sector deleverage, that enabled Japan to avert a protracted economic depression (Koo 2011). 
 
Large intersectoral intertemporal exchanges take place mainly through financial intermediaries. 
Therefore default as a general solution places the whole banking system at risk; not just the savings 
of the saving class. 
 
Negative Interest Rates 
One way to participate in sustainable inter-sectoral intertemporal exchange would be to allow for 
negative interest rates. Thus flows of nutrients from S to L or to G could be struck at negative 
underlying interest rates, meaning that required reverse flows (to S) could be smaller than the initial 
flows (from S). 
 
One way of achieving negative real interest rates is through inflation. While inflation is in reality 
much more difficult to construct than classical monetary theory would allow23, inflation does have 
the virtue of minimising the need for nutrients to flow from those who need them to those who have 
no present use for them. Certainly inflation did help the global economy to correct the financial 
imbalances that emerged in the mid-1970s after the oil-producing countries claimed their economic 
rents. 
 
There are other ways that the global economies can operate with underlying negative interest rates – 
the rate that is required to enable intertemporal exchange when there are many lenders and few 
                                                 
23 Due to liquidity traps. In the 1930s, as in Japan in the 1990s (Koo2011), low interest rates if anything reinforced 
deflation. Especially in a world of flexible-rate financial contracts, cost-deflation may increase, while demand-inflation 
cannot occur in a liquidity trap. Inflation generally requires a different type of crisis; a crisis in which nutrients 
belonging to S are over-allocated. Such a crisis may well exist in the 2020s and 2030s as globally 'invested' pension 
funds are spent – Corden's "return journey" (2011) writ large (Rankin 2010a, p.99). 
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borrowers. This is especially true in societies which have embraced electronic payments' systems.24 
Most loans would continue to have positive interest rates, given the risk premiums that pertain to 
real-world lending. 
 
Modifying the Rules of Distribution 
To see how these kinds of problem have been resolved in the past we note the great events of the 
capitalist era, including global colonisation (Wakefield 1833),25 world warfare, depressions and 
inflations. These ex-post resolutions of chronic accumulations of credit balances do not represent 
the self-interest of the S-class, but neither does non-resolution. 
 
A more benign approach is to make changes to the rules that determine the income distribution; the 
distribution of nutrients. A promising approach is the recognition of public equity (Rankin 2011a) 
as a part of the answer. Thus the public – the owners of publicly owned and public domain assets – 
may draw an equity benefit26 in much the same way that private equity holders draw company 
dividends. Equity benefits – equal for all citizens – proportionately favour L over S. Thus, more 
nutrients would flow directly to L, both as equity benefits to supplement wages, and as higher wage 
rates given the increase in bargaining power a second income stream gives to workers.27 Thus 
L-class spending on wage goods, financed by income rather than by debt (direct rather than indirect 
arterial flows), could, through increased business confidence, facilitate a level of S-class spending 
on investment goods that would restore full-employment. 
 
Governments would be required to assert and enforce such property-income rights. Given that each 
government has jurisdiction over only a part of the global economy, such governments would also 
need to assert the right to tax imports from jurisdictions which do not pay public equity benefits. 
(Much as today they enhance efficiency by placing tariffs on goods produced with child labour, 
from unsustainable clearances of rain forests, or incurring other negative externalities.) 
 
 
                                                 
24 It could be possible to impose negative interest rates on cash. The supply of bank-notes would be fixed, much as the 
supply of fishing quota or pollution permits is fixed. People who wanted to withdraw money as cash would pay a 
market-determined premium that would be closely related to 'fees' paid by depositors to banks. 
25 Wakefield's (1833) central concept is the "field of production", meaning profitable investment opportunities. 
26 New Zealand Superannuation is one of the best present examples in the world of a public equity benefit. Public equity 
benefits payable to people of working age would work best with medium-high flat tax rates – the BIFT tax-benefit 
system – and of course set at lower amounts than payable to retirees. 
27 In pre-industrial and early-industrial times, when workers owned plots of land, such workers could more easily say 
"no" to exploitative wages. 
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In our model, Government payments of transfers – distinct from public equity benefits – are 
represented by an arterial flow from G to L (redistribution) in Figure 5. Public equity payments 
however would simply represent a change in the rules of distribution, with, ceteris paribus, an 
increased nutrient share going to L and a decreased share (small, relative to S's current share) going 
to S. While fewer G to L transfer payments would be required, vertical equity considerations – 
especially within the L-class – would mean that such transfers would still play a role in the actual 
modern world economy. 
 
In general, a sustainable solution to a problem of systemic unallocation of capital28 within the 
S-sector must involve a reduction of S's income share, or at least an end to the tendency of income 
to concentrate in the S-class. The public equity benefit approach ensures that, as labour productivity 
increases, public equity benefits also increase, thus enabling a larger (or at least a stable) income 
share for L. We might also note that, if L-members have a mechanism that better distributes their 
productivity gains back to themselves, then they are increasingly empowered to take their gains in a 
non-material form (namely, as increased leisure, meaning increased free time).29  
 
This leads us back to the notion, expressed earlier, that overall economic success can be essentially 
regarded as the raising of the material (and non-material) living standards that prevail within the 
L-class. The S-class, of course, always have higher living standards than the L-class. 
 
For the S-class, the rule is 'use-it or lose-it'. The squirrel that hoards its acorns dies with its acorns 
unconsumed. It might just as well have tipped them down a black hole30; or, more sensibly, 'lent' 
them to another squirrel, without requiring repayment. 
 
                                                 
28 The Economist discusses "Modern Monetary Theory", along with the views of Abba Lerner that "private spending 
might be chronically weak" and that governments may need to accumulate debt indefinitely. Certainly my view is that 
private spending in the world economy is in a phase of chronic weakness that goes beyond that of a normal recession. 
Koo (2011) contrasts normal recessions with balance sheet recessions and convincingly shows that the western world 
economy at least is stuck in the later. While the possibility of indefinite accumulation of private surpluses is not 
necessarily pessimistic – it may indeed open up more sustainable development options this century – I think it fairly 
reflects an innate hard-wired mercantilism; a negative-sum game in which private actors try to exchange actual present 
wealth for unrealisable claims on future public wealth. 
29 Rankin (2011c) discusses multiple scenarios of productivity increase, and how tax policy may facilitate forms of 
productivity growth that do not assume inputs (the productivity denominator) have to increase. 
30 A good metaphor for the way mercantilists understand their markets as external to their sector or nation. 
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Conclusion 
Our closed-economy model of three nodal-sectors linked strongly to a production centre and weakly 
to each other represents a departure from twentieth century circular flow models. As such, there is a 
close analogy to the flows of nutrients (output from the production centre, income to the nodes) and 
blood plasma (the circulating medium) in the human body. Income is "stuff", as Krugman (2012) 
puts it, not money. As in classical economics, the representation highlights inter-class income 
distributions; in particular the tendency for incomes to accumulate within a societal grouping that is 
least willing to consume that output. 
 
Unlike classical economics, and in the spirit of Keynesian economics, it exposes the paradoxes of 
thrift and insufficient investment opportunities, showing how these problems lead to unsustainable 
inter-sectoral intertemporal exchanges between sectors; first by the saving class lending to the 
relatively poor, and second through the saving class lending to governments who, not having simple 
write-off mechanisms, soon come to resist this role of debtor-of-last-resort. 
 
Economic disaster can be postponed by the ever-willingness – indeed wilful blindness (Heffernan 
2011) – of saving class creditors to not acknowledge the technical insolvency of their public sector 
debtors. Indeed, under conditions in which few of those creditors wish to complete their 
transactions, this pretence, that goods and services are being loaned rather than given to the 
governments and low-income citizens who need them, may be able to persist for a long time; 
perhaps decades. 
 
So perhaps it is the governments who are letting their citizens down. They are reluctant to play the 
game correctly, in not being willing to purchase the otherwise unallocated surpluses, for fear of 
creditors who have rights to but little desire for such goods and services. There is plenty amidst the 
poverty, and governments do have the power to prevent further concentration of goods and services 
in the hands of those who will not make use of them. 
 
The closed-economy nature of the human circulatory system shows that imbalance in once sector 
must be accommodated elsewhere. The system reaches critical point when there is insufficient 
accommodation. In the human body that generally means death. In human systems, however, we 
can choose other outcomes. It was this biological system that inspired early modern economic 
thinkers into the concept of equilibrium. We can still learn by returning to our original sources of 
inspiration. By stating the obvious – that for every sector that utilises less than it earns, another 
sector must utilise more than it earns – we make the implicit explicit. 
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